The assumptions required for the derivation of Bell inequalities are not usually satisfied for random fields in which there are non-zero thermal or quantum fluctuations, in contrast to the general satisfaction of the assumptions in the classical two point particle case. In the absence of Bell inequalities, random field theories that include quantum fluctuations explicitly may be introduced where previously only quantum field theories have been thought to be possible.
Introduction
Bell [1, Chap. 7, originally 1976] shows that from a definition of local causality, we can derive Bell inequalities for observable statistics associated with two space-like separated regions R A and R B (see figure 1) , and that quantum theory does not satisfy the same inequalities. Bell's derivation uses the language of "beables", but the mathematics requires only that random variables are associated with regions of space-time, prompting us here to introduce a random field to remove the niceties of Bell's concept of "beables".
A random field can be constructed as a random variable-valued distribution, analogously to the operator-valued distributions of quantum field theory, from which we can construct a set of random variables indexed by regions of spacetime (or more generally by elements of a Schwartz space of functions). The violation of Bell inequalities by experiment has imposed a moratorium on the construction of classical models, because it is generally acknowledged (and it Email address: peter.morgan@philosophy.ox.ac.uk (Peter Morgan). URL: http://users.ox.ac.uk/∼sfop0045 (Peter Morgan).
Past(R A ) ∩ Past(R B ) o a, λ b, µ c, ν is urged here) that the assumptions required to derive Bell inequalities for classical two point particle models are satisfied, but the assumptions required to derive Bell inequalities for random fields are very strong and are not usually satisfied if there are non-zero thermal or quantum fluctuations. The distinction between classical point particles and random fields lies in the existence of correlations between random variables associated with Past(R A ) ∩ Past(R B ), Past(R A ) − Past(R B ), and Past(R B ) − Past(R A ), which is not usual for two classical point particles that emerge from a central source that lies completely in Past(R A ) ∩ Past(R B ), but is general for random fields. The distinction does not lie in finite and infinite degrees of freedom.
Provided there are such correlations, we may introduce random field models where classical two point particle models are not adequate and where previously only quantum field models have been thought adequate. After the main argument of this paper, section 6 discusses random field models and their relationship to quantum field models.
Apart from the understanding of quantum field theory that is afforded by clearly describing the relationship between random fields and quantum fields, an advantage of using random fields instead of quantum fields is that this approach reduces the conceptual distance to general relativity.
Against Bell [1, Chap. 7] , Shimony, Horne, and Clauser [2, originally 1976] show that if random variables associated with Past(R A ) − Past(R B ) and with Past(R B ) − Past(R A ) are correlated with random variables associated with Past(R A ) ∩ Past(R B ), then a model need not satisfy the Bell inequalities. Bell [1, Chap. 12, originally 1977 ] admits this, but finds that random variables associated with Past(R A ) ∩ Past(R B ) have to be correlated with instrument settings in R A and in R B . Arguing that such a requirement is unreasonable, Bell calls it a "conspiracy"[1, Chap. 12, p. 103]. Bell's argument and Shimony, Horne, and Clauser's comments are brought together in a review article by d'Espagnat [3] .
The literature on Bell inequalities for "beables" is quite sparse, and has not changed the general perception that Bell[1, Chap. 12] more-or-less closes the discussion. The more general literature on Bell inequalities, for which the assumptions required to derive Bell inequalities are discussed quite clearly by Valdenebro [4] , has come to the same conclusion. Section 2 will reproduce Bell's mathematical argument in the form given by d'Espagnat [3] , both to keep this paper more-or-less self-contained and to allow the assumptions required for the derivation to be highlighted. Appendix A discusses the relationship between Bell inequalities for "beables" and the more general literature, in the light of Section 2.
The random variables (a, λ), (b, µ), and (c, ν) are associated with the disjoint regions Past(R A ) − Past(R B ), Past(R B ) − Past(R A ), and Past(R A ) ∩ Past(R B ), respectively. a, b, and c are "non-hidden"[1, Chap. 12] random variables, instrument settings that are observed and possibly controlled by the experimenter, while λ, µ, and ν are "hidden" random variables, neither observed nor controlled by the experimenter. As far as classical physics is concerned, the separation of random variables into (a, λ), (b, µ), and (c, ν) is arbitrary, because anything that is hidden today may be revealed tomorrow and whether we observe or record random variables makes no difference, so any derivation of Bell inequalities must be robust under different choices of the separation. There is nothing about the mathematics of section 2 that will determine a separation of random variables into (a, λ), (b, µ), and (c, ν). The only difference between non-hidden random variables and hidden random variables will be that we will integrate over all values of hidden random variables and never integrate over values of non-hidden random variables. It will be useful to consider three choices in this paper: (1) all of a, b, c, λ, µ, and ν are non-null sets of random variables; (2) ν is a complete set of random variables, so that c is null; and (3) c is a complete set of random variables, so that ν is null.
The fundamental definition in Bell's derivation of inequalities is that for a locally causal theory, for X any random variable associated with a space-time region R X , X ∩ all of the random variables associated with Past(R X )∩Past(R Y ), X p some of the random variables associated with Past(R X ) − Past(R Y ), and Y any random variable associated with a space-time region R Y that is spacelike separated from R X , the conditional probability of X given X ∩ and X p is statistically independent of Y ,
(In an abuse of notation, we will write X for an event involving the random variable X; where we discuss several events involving the same random variable, they will be denoted X, X ′ , etc. which may be thought of as shorthand for events E X , E ′ X , etc. This lets us keep close to the notation of the original papers [1, 2, 3] . In an alternative terminology, usual in philosophy, correlation between X and Y is "screened off" by X ∩ and X p .) This definition of local causality is applied a number of times in Bell's derivation of inequalities.
Shimony, Horne, and Clauser [2] , in contrast, weaken the definition of a locally causal theory, so that for X and Y as above, but for X P all of the random variables associated with Past(R X ), the conditional probability of X given X P is statistically independent of Y ,
(Correlation between X and Y is "screened off" by X P .) The two definitions of a locally causal theory are the same if X p happens to be all the random variables in Past(R X ) − Past(R Y ), but note that the definition of X p is so loose that it can even be any single random variable associated with Past(R X )−Past(R Y ). Equation (1) is presumably supposed to be satisfied for an arbitrary choice of random variables as X p , so it is X ∩ that is characteristic of equation (1). Equation (1) combines equation (2), which is a much more natural definition of local causality, with a principle that correlations only arise because of common causes. Equation (1) generalizes an idea that two point particles leave a central source at the same time as a common cause of two events in regions R A and R B , entirely reasonable for a classical two point particle model, to a much more tendentious idea that there must be a common cause of the two events even in a random field model for an experiment. Equation (2), however, is not strong enough to allow Bell inequalities to be derived. Some of the applications of equation (1) can be replaced by applications of equation (2), but some cannot. As well as the well-known "no-conspiracy" assumption (discussed in section 3), which prohibits correlations between instrument settings and hidden random variables and is needed whether we adopt equation (1) or equation (2) as our definition of a locally causal theory, section 2 further identifies a "no-correlation" assumption (discussed in section 4), which prohibits correlations between hidden random variables. The "no-correlation" assumption is only needed if we adopt equation (2) as our definition of a locally causal theory.
Although equation (2) is a natural definition of local causality, even it is not satisfied by the signal local and Lorentz invariant but analytically nonlocal dynamics discussed in [5] . With such a dynamics, p(X|X P , Y ) = p(X|X P ), even though the nonlocal effects of such a dynamics are restricted to heatequation-like exponentially reducing tails and signal locality is satisfied.
The derivation of Bell inequalities for random fields also requires an assumption that apparatus must be independent, which is innocuous if almost all random variables are hidden, but is not innocuous if almost all random variables are non-hidden, when significant correlations should be expected. Section 2 identifies an "independent-apparatus" assumption (discussed in section 3), and shows the "independent-apparatus" assumption to be closely related to the "no-conspiracy" assumption. These three assumptions cannot be considered independently. Indeed, which assumptions should be considered to be unsatisfied in a model for an experiment that violates Bell inequalities will depend on what separation there is of random variables into (a, λ), (b, µ), and (c, ν), since the assumptions refer to correlations between non-hidden and nonhidden random variables ("independent-apparatus"), between non-hidden and hidden random variables ("no-conspiracy"), and between hidden and hidden random variables ("no-correlation").
Section 5 shows that the violation of Bell inequalities alone does not justify preferring a quantum field model over a random field model by considering the similarities between a quantum field theoretic Wigner quasi-probability description and a random field probability description of a complete experimental apparatus that violates a Bell inequality. A quantum field model for a complete experimental apparatus requires as much "conspiracy" as a random field model.
The derivation of Bell inequalities for random fields
Assumptions that are required to derive Bell inequalities, and that will be discussed in sections 3 and 4, will be indicated by [[Notes in brackets]].
Suppose that A and B are random variables associated with regions R A and R B . Applying equation (1) or equation (2), the conditional probability density p(A|a, b, c, λ, µ, ν, B) is statistically independent of b, µ, and B in a locally causal theory, and similarly for the conditional probability density p(B|a, b, c, λ, µ, ν, A),
The mean of the product AB, given an event (a, b, c), is
where the conditional probability density p(λ, µ, ν|a, b, c) can be rewritten, applying no more than the definition of conditional probability, as
Applying equation (1), or, through a putative argument provided by Shimony, Horne, and Clauser [2] and discussed in section 4, applying equation (2), we can derive
is the "no-correlation" assumption; equations (8) and (9) are further assumptions, which might be called "no-nonlocalconspiracy" assumptions, but will not be directly addressed here]], so the mean of the product AB, given the event (a, b, c), is
where A(a, c, ν) is the mean of A averaged over the hidden random variables λ, given the event (a, c, ν), and similarly for B(b, c, ν).
Suppose that A and B satisfy |A| ≤ 1 and |B| ≤ 1, so that |A(a, c, ν)| ≤ 1 and |B(b, c, ν)| ≤ 1. If we also suppose that
[[p(ν|a, b, c) = p(ν|c) is the already known "no-conspiracy" assumption]], then we can derive, for distinct events a, a ′ , and b, b ′ for the non-hidden random variables a and b,
[[Being able to change a → a ′ without changing c or b and b → b ′ without changing c or a is the "independent-apparatus" assumption.]] so that
In contrast, for two spin-half particles, we can derive the inequalities
which is essentially the Cirel'son bound [6] , but, for a random field model,
or if we cannot change a, b, and c independently, -dependent apparatus then we can only derive the inequalities
Classically, quantum mechanics is half-way between the conditions for deriving Bell inequalities and the maximum violation, when equation (16) is satisfied as an equality. There must, therefore, be principled constraints on initial conditions in a random field model to ensure the maximum violation is never observed, as well as to allow some violation.
The no-conspiracy and independent-apparatus assumptions
The prohibition of correlations of a with c, and of b with c, the "independentapparatus" assumption, is closely related to the "no-conspiracy" assumption. If we suppose that ν is a complete set of random variables, so that c is null, we can derive in place of equation (10) , supposing that equations (7), (8) , and (9) are satisfied,
which requires that
for us to be able to derive Bell inequalities. If we take a and b to be only instrument settings at the time of the measurement, with c null, the "no-conspiracy" assumption asserts that instrument settings at the time of the measurement must be completely uncorrelated with the experimental apparatus (which is, after all, almost entirely in Past(R A ) ∩ Past(R B )). Ensuring that instrument settings are completely uncorrelated with the experimental apparatus would seem a remarkable achievement in a random field theory setting.
Bell argues [1, Chap. 12] that the dynamics of a mechanism to choose the instrument settings can be made chaotic enough that, even if there are correlations between (c, ν) and (a, b), the instrument settings may nonetheless be taken to be "at least effectively free for the purposes at hand". From a classical point of view, this is a remarkable claim. Either there are correlations in a model for an experiment or there are not. Correlations that are easy to measure at one time are generally not as easy to measure at other times, but the practicality of measuring correlations has no bearing on whether there are correlations, which is in principle unaffected by whether the evolution is chaotic or not.
In any case, a and b being "free for the purposes at hand" does not imply p(ν|a, b) = p(ν). A correlation p(ν|a, b) = p(ν) does not "determine" a and b (or ν), but only describes a statistical relationship between a, b, and ν. If there is a correlation between a, b, and ν, and we arrange or observe particular statistics for a and b, it just must have been the case that ν had statistics compatible with the correlation, even though we did not control or measure ν. However, ν is not measured -by definition, since it's "hidden" -so we can only surmise whether there is in fact such a correlation and whether the statistics of ν are compatible with the correlation.
Bell also argues [1, Chap. 12] "that the disagreement between locality and quantum mechanics is large -up to a factor of √ 2 in a certain sense". First of all, Bell's argument is slightly weakened by the classical limit being either 2 or 4 (Bell omits to mention the latter), depending on whether we accept all the standard assumptions, with 2 √ 2 as the intermediate quantum mechanical limit. More critically, the standard assumptions discussed here are given as analytic equalities, which are unable to elaborate Bell's "certain sense". A random field model is so general that it is unclear how the no-correlation, nononlocal-conspiracy, no-conspiracy, and independent-apparatus assumptions could instead be given as physically justifiable limits on inequality (note that the standard assumptions are problematic just as analytic equalities between probability distributions, since such a relationship cannot be supported by experimental statistics, nor, it seems, by analytic argument). For a random field model to be empirically adequate, there is no requirement that the assumptions be violated by much, only that the totality of correlations be such that the dynamical evolution will result in the violation of Bell inequalities at the time of measurement.
Suppose that instead of taking ν to be complete information, we take c to be complete information, so that ν is null. Then we can derive, in place of equation (10), again supposing that equations (7), (8) , and (9) 
Now to derive equation (14), we have to make only the "independent-apparatus" assumption, so that we can change a → a ′ without changing c (or b) and we can change b → b ′ without changing c (or a), with the "no-conspiracy" as-sumption playing no rôle.
In quantum field theory, the Reeh-Schlieder theorem [7] is typically thought very awkward, yet the apparatus-dependence it implies is not taken to rule out quantum field theory. Recall that as a consequence of the Reeh-Schlieder theorem we cannot change a quantum field state so that the expected value of a quantum field observable associated with Past(R A ) − Past(R B ) changes without changing the expected value of almost all quantum field observables associated with both Past(R A )∩Past(R B ) and Past(R B )−Past(R A ). Applied in the context of Bell inequalities for random fields, this is just to say that it is impossible in quantum field theory to change a → a ′ without changing c at least some of the time, if c is the complete set of observables in Past(R A ) ∩ Past(R B ). If instead ν is the complete set of random variables in Past(R A ) ∩ Past(R B ), the Reeh-Schlieder theorem would then be just to say that the "noconspiracy" assumption cannot be satisfied in quantum field theory -there must be correlations between ν and (a, b).
If c is not complete information, the correlations of c with a and b should be expected to lessen as c includes fewer and fewer random variables; the correlations should not be expected to become identically zero as soon as c is not the complete set of random variables in Past(R A ) ∩ Past(R B ). Whether we measure or do not measure random variables in the past should not make any difference, in a classical model, to whether violation of Bell inequalities can be observed, but will change the description we give of the correlations we take to cause the violation.
It is unreasonable to expect the "independent-apparatus" and "no-conspiracy" assumptions to be satisfied by a random field model when we do not expect them of quantum field theory -to do so is to construct a straw man of a theory. If we insist on a parallel of the Reeh-Schlieder theorem for random fields, we cannot derive Bell inequalities for random fields.
The no-correlation assumption
Recall that the "no-correlation" assumption, equation (7), requires that there are no correlations between the hidden random variables λ and the hidden random variables µ (that are not screened off by ν, a, b, and c). There is no empirical way to justify this assumption, simply because it is a condition imposed on random variables that are by definition not measured. The preference against correlations between instrument settings and hidden random variables is only tendentiously extensible to justify a prohibition against correlations between hidden random variables. Shimony, Horne, and Clauser [2] argue that "even though the space-time region in which λ is located extends to negative infinity in time, ν, a, c are all the beables other than λ itself in the backward light cone of this region, and µ and b do refer to beables with space-like separation from the λ region" (their emphasis) to justify deriving equations (7), (8) , and (9) from equation (2) (no additional argument is needed if we take equation (1) as our definition of local causality). This argument relies on the unbounded extent of Past(R A ) − Past(R B ), so that on a simple interpretation the only random variables associated with the region Past(Past(R A ) − Past(R B )) are c and ν, since a and λ are associated with the region Past(R A ) − Past(R B ) itself. Consider, however, that for any time-slice Past(R A ) T of Past(R A ) at time T , we would expect the complete set of random variables associated with Past(R A ) T to determine random variables associated with R A (at least probabilistically), but we would not expect the complete set of random variables associated with Past(R A ) T ∩ Past(R B ) T to determine random variables associated with R A . As we consider earlier and earlier time-slices, the contribution from Past(R A ) T −Past(R B ) T becomes less and less, but the contribution only becomes exactly zero in the infinite past if there is no incoming light-like contribution.
Assuming that random variables that determine observables in R A and R B must be associated with the whole of Past(R A ) and Past(R B ) goes against the usual structure of classical physics, which almost always takes initial conditions to be associated with a time-slice of the past (usually a hypersurface, but at most a space-time region of finite duration), not to be associated with the whole of the past. The competing definitions of local causality, and the whole derivation of Bell inequalities for random fields, may be put in terms of an arbitrary time-slice of Past(R A ) and Past(R B ). If we associate the random variables λ, µ, ν, a, b, and c with a time-slice of the backward light-cones, not with the whole backward light-cones, Shimony, Horne, and Clauser's argument fails to justify deriving equations (7), (8) , and (9) from equation (2).
Shimony, Horne, and Clauser's argument effectively reintroduces common causation, by requiring that there is no causation associated with the region outside Past(R A ) ∩ Past(R B ). As for the no-conspiracy and independentapparatus assumptions, there is no requirement that the no-correlation assumption be violated by much, only that the totality of correlations of all three kinds be such that the dynamical evolution will result in the violation of Bell inequalities at the time of measurement.
Shimony, Horne, and Clauser's argument is contrary to the intention behind equation (2), which is that the complete causal past of a region determines its present (again, at least probabilistically, even if not deterministically). If we take the trouble to distinguish between equation (1) and equation (2) as definitions of local causality, we can't argue for equations (7), (8) , and (9) in a way that quietly negates the distinction.
The chaotic behaviour that Bell invokes to assert that instrument settings cannot be significantly correlated in fact operates rather against Bell's overall argument, since then manifest measured correlations between non-hidden random variables at the time of measurement are all the more likely to be unmeasurable correlations between hidden random variables before the time of measurement.
A quantum field theory approach
We have become used to describing the outcome of Bell violating experiments using a state in a complex 4-dimensional Hilbert space, in which many detailed degrees of freedom are integrated out. If we agree, however, that nonrelativistic quantum mechanics is a reduction of quantum field theory -as we almost always do -such a state is a reduction of a quantum field state in an infinite-dimensional Hilbert space, which gives the values of quantum field observables associated with the regions R A and R B . If Bell inequalities are violated by observables of a quantum field state, we would certainly attribute the violation to the experimenters' ingenuity in ensuring an appropriate initial quantum field state and making appropriate measurements. For a quantum field state describing an experimental apparatus that violates Bell inequalities, the existence of strong correlations between observables at large space-like separations is a large part of what singles out such states as special (Bell inequalities are violated slightly even for the vacuum [8] , but unmeasurably at large space-like separations). A quantum field state that describes experimental correlations that measurably violate Bell inequalities at the time of measurement describes correlations in the remote past different from those of the vacuum state, but, as for a random field model, differences from the vacuum state may be difficult to detect in the remote past. In quasi-probability terms, we have to set up a Wigner quasi-distribution over phase space in the past that evolves to a Wigner quasi-distribution over phase space at the time of measurement t M that violates a Bell inequality in the regions R A and R B .
For an equilibrium state of a random field model, correlations between random variables that violate the assumption of statistical independence at space-like separation generally decrease more-or-less exponentially fast with increasing distance, but strong correlations at arbitrarily large distances are possible for non-equilibrium states. Indeed, absolutely any correlations are allowed in a non-equilibrium initial condition -initial conditions of low probability of course require greater free energy to set up, but we should not forget how difficult it is to construct an experiment that violates Bell inequalities. In a random field model, we have to set up a probability distribution over phase space in the past that evolves to a probability distribution over phase space at time t M that violates a Bell inequality in the regions R A and R B , but this is no greater "conspiracy" than is apparent in the full quantum field state for the experiment (to be explicit, note the parallel between the Wigner quasidistribution description and the classical probability description).
The statistics we observe for random variables in the region R A ∪ R B are no more than classical initial conditions. We cannot rule out any classical dynamics, whether local or non-local, without Bell's other assumptions, which amount to a claim that unobserved initial conditions at earlier times cannot, for a priori reasons, be correlated in such a way that the observed initial conditions at the time of measurement are as we observe them. There are often significant reasons for preferring a quantum field model over a random field model, such as ease of computation and years of familiarity, but the violation of Bell inequalities is a tendentious reason.
The correlations we have discussed here commit us to very little, if we take an equally empiricist approach to random fields as we take to quantum fields: there just are correlations, which we don't have to assume are caused by common (or any other kind of) causes. Classical physics has always taken initial conditions to be more-or-less explained by earlier initial conditions, with no final explanation being essential.
Random field models for experiments
Suppose that we observe many times the measurement settings s A and s B and the measurement results A and B on the two arms of an experiment that violates Bell inequalities, which we will take to be a paradigm of quantum mechanical experiment. The observed actual statistics over (s A , A, s B , B) can be modelled by a joint probability distribution p(s A , A, s B , B) (see Appendix B). Any probability distribution that has p(s A , A, s B , B) as a marginal probability distribution is an adequate contextual model for the experiment. It's a contextual model just because the measurement settings are part of it.
The measurements required to violate Bell inequalities experimentally require only that we measure compatible observables (s A , A, s B , B) in a single experimental context, where the measurement settings s A and s B are rapidly changed from moment to moment. It is straightforward to construct a hidden variable model for p(s A , A, s B , B) just by measuring additional observables that are compatible with s A , A, s B , and B. For example, we could replace s A by measurements of geometrical details of the experimental apparatus, from which s A can be derived, or we could replace A by details of the thermodynamic states of whatever detectors we are using, from which A can be derived.
There is of course a quantum mechanical limit to the hierarchy of increasingly detailed random variable models that can be constructed by quantummechanically measuring more and more mutually commuting observables. However, in a random field model of quantum mechanical measurement[5, particularly Appendix A], the incompatibility of measurements is due to quantum fluctuations. Random field models explicitly represent the quantum fluctuations of measurement devices, which gives enough theoretical freedom to let us construct random field models that describe the measurement results we would obtain if we had a measurement device that has zero quantum fluctuations. The fact that such ideal measurement devices are not available does not prevent us from describing the results of such idealized measurements, always on the understanding that we will explicitly describe the quantum fluctuations of measurement devices that we actually have, and their effects on measured systems, whenever necessary, just as we describe the thermal fluctuations of measurement devices only when necessary.
The strength of quantum field theory, and its principal difference from random field theory, is that it can construct a state that describes more than one experimental apparatus in which there are different measurement devices that have not had their quantum fluctuations reduced to zero -there is, however, a sleight of hand required.
Suppose we begin with quantum field descriptions of several complete experimental apparatuses, which share a common preparation device, but each has a different measurement device. The claim of quantum mechanics is that there is a single quantum state that is unchanged by replacing one of the measurement devices by another, precisely so that different measurement results can be described by a trace formula Tr[ρÔ i ], with a single density operatorρ representing the preparation device and with different measurement operatorsÔ i representing the different measurement devices (more generally, positive operatorvalued measures (POVMs) may be required to describe measurements [10] , but this does not affect the essential claim, that there is a single density operator ρ that adequately describes several experiments). A classical point particle model accepts a similar claim that measurement devices can be reliably separated from a non-contextual classical point particle state, but in a random field context an absolute, well-defined separation of preparation and measurement devices is not available.
Quantum field theory does not claim that a random field state is not changed by replacing measurement devices, but instead defines a quantum field state to be something that is not changed by replacing measurement devices -always supposing, however, that the different measurement devices have no thermal fluctuations or other properties that interact with the measured system in a way that must be explicitly described. Quantum field theory is understandably conceptually distinct from random field theory as a result, and quantum field models are analytically distinct from random field models just because of the Kochen-Specker paradox [9] , but both approaches are empirically justifiable.
Conclusion
We have first described the previously identified difference between Bell's definition of a locally causal theory, which insists that correlations have to be the result of common causes, and Shimony, Horne, and Clauser's definition, which does not. Secondly, we have described numerous assumptions that random variables may not be correlated with other random variables, all of which are necessary for Bell inequalities to be derived, but none of which are analytically satisfied for a random field in the presence of thermal or quantum fluctuations. Although the assumptions identified here are not analytically satisfied in any detailed random field model of an experiment, of course they may be "nearly" satisfied. However, arguments that these assumptions being nearly satisfied is sufficient to derive Bell inequalities fail to give explicit bounds, and their physical plausibility is suspect, because the extensive correlations that are present at the thermodynamic transition of a measurement device that constitutes an "event" are precisely identifiable and measurable at the time of the event, but are almost always not measurable at earlier times.
We have also seen that the opprobrium of "conspiracy" as much applies to quantum fields as it does to random fields. We could argue from this that quantum field models should as much be rejected as random field models, but it seems more appropriate for physics to admit both. The long-standing moratorium on construction of classical models loses most of its justification if we allow ourselves to use the resources of random fields.
To temper the localism of this paper, repeating the caution given in the introduction, a random field model that reproduces the phenomenological success of a quantum field model has to have the same propagator as the given quantum field model, which in classical terms is nonlocal even while preserving signal locality and being Lorentz invariant [5] . It is well known that quantum field theory is nonlocal in the sense of Hegerfeldt [11] , while nonetheless preserving signal locality [12] . The violation of Bell inequalities can be modelled by entirely local random fields, but leave an awkward question of how the nonlocal correlations might have been established in the first place (that is, how did the "conspiracy" arise?), which finds a relatively more natural answer if the propagator of a random field model is nonlocal.
Bell inequalities are no more than a constraint on initial conditions, which results from making an a priori assumption about how the initial conditions arose -there is supposed always to be a common cause for the separated events. This is quite a natural assumption for a classical two particle model, but it is quite a strong assumption for a random field model. I am indebted to most of the people in and who have passed through Oxford's Philosophy of Physics community.
A Bell's original approach
The more general literature on Bell inequalities more-or-less follows Bell's original approach [1, Chap. 2] , in that λ, µ, and ν are not distinguished by their space-time associations, but all hidden random variables are instead written as a single set Λ. Also, a and b are generally taken to be settings at the time of measurement, so that they are associated with R A and R B instead of with Past(R A ) − Past(R B ) and Past(R B ) − Past(R A ). Finally, c is generally taken to be null. However, only the lack of distinction between λ, µ, and ν makes a significant difference. Following the analysis of Section 2, the more general literature (rationally reconstructed, since notations are legion) writes in which the assumptions required to derive equations (A.3) and (A.4) correspond to Jarrett's "completeness" and "locality" respectively [13] (or "outcome independence" and "parameter independence" in Shimony's terminology [14] ). To allow Bell's original approach, it has to be assumed further that p(Λ|a, b) = p(Λ) ("no-conspiracy"). If we take Λ to be the microstate of a measured system, as we typically do if we think we are measuring the state of two classical point particles, correlation of Λ with a and b represents contextuality of the measured system state, which is generally taken to be anathema. In a random field context, however, it is far more natural to take Λ to be the microstate of the whole experimental apparatus, because for general random fields there is no natural way to draw an exact boundary between what would usually be termed the measurement device and the measured system, so that it seems that Λ must be correlated with a and b.
The derivation of Bell inequalities given in Section 2 subsumes the discussion that is possible if we do not distinguish λ, µ, and ν, so we will not further pursue the limited approach of this Appendix.
B Compatible and incompatible observables
A probability distribution p(s A , A, s B , B) is not a "quadrivariate" probability distribution over incompatible observables, which would lead directly to Bell-type inequalities that disagree with quantum theoretical predictions [15] without any locality assumptions being necessary. In contrast, a probability distribution over (A 1 , A A probability distribution p(A, s A , B, s B ) is a quadrivariate probability distribution over compatible observables precisely because these observables are at the classical level of description of the experiment.
